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FLIP-FLOPPER WITH THE FINAL SAY
Roosevelt and Japan
Discerning the foreign policy intentions of Franklin Delano Roosevelt is a noto-
riously difficult task. The president made conflicting statements and rarely gave 
clear indications of his postwar aims to his advisers. Roosevelt was also not an 
expert on East Asia, and Japan was not at the top of his agenda. Nonetheless, FDR 
considered identifying goals for the postwar world during the war to be “a very 
valuable thing.”1 Roosevelt explained in 1942 that he hoped the State Department 
planning project would provide him a basket of plans into which he could reach 
to find postwar policy at the end of the conflict.2 Planning and speculation about 
postwar Japan in the government, media, and informed circles all fit neatly into 
this metaphor. Wartime discussions were meant not to set a definite course but 
to build a framework and make future decisions easier. As Roosevelt saw it, dur-
ing the previous war victors had been left without clear agreed aims because not 
enough postwar planning had taken place. Instead, the participants of the Ver-
sailles peace conference that followed World War I had been like ladies packing at 
the last minute for a husband’s trip. Every one, Roosevelt recalled, was “rushing 
around, grabbing things out of closets and throwing them into suitcases.”3 His 
new basket approach would be more orderly than the ill-considered frenzy that 
had created a failed peace in 1919.
Roosevelt’s simple picture of the planning process was complicated by his own 
administrative style. The president was reluctant to consult or inform his official 
experts and advisers, creating a deep rift between the White House and the State 
Department. This rift in turn meant that Asia experts in the State Department, 
who would frame postwar actions, were isolated from actual policy made during 
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FLIP-FLOPPER WITH THE FINAL SAY      9
the war. Casually made commitments, preconceived ideas, irregular consultation 
with experts, and rivalry between would-be advisers marred long-range planning 
in the Roosevelt era.
Because FDR was expected to have the final word in deciding policy, any plans 
for the future developed by experts accommodated his decisions and opinions. 
It is a challenge to divine which policies Roosevelt considered pulling from the 
policy basket before his death. In the absence of clear evidence, the president’s 
thinking can be pieced together from his favored sources of information and 
management of advisers, his postwar plans for Germany and China, his com-
ments on Japan, and the commitments he made at international conferences.
Lack of communication between the president and bureaucratic planning 
groups led to divergence between the president’s aims and policy drafts. How-
ever, Roosevelt supported the planner’s work to provide him with a diverse set 
of options, and in so doing he allowed for the development of a policy-creating 
network during the war. After Roosevelt’s unexpected death, his successor inher-
ited the policies created by that network.
Sources of Information and Analysis
Roosevelt’s management created an atmosphere of policy confusion that charac-
terized postwar planning. Roosevelt rarely spoke frankly with his advisers, who 
as a result could not incorporate his feedback into their work. In 1940 Ambas-
sador Joseph Grew requested information on the president’s thinking on Japan. 
The country, Grew wrote, had veered toward militarism, waged a war of aggres-
sion in China, and appeared to be on a collision course with the United States. 
The ambassador needed to understand his president’s views in order to calibrate 
American policy on the ground. In his understated manner, Grew wrote that 
without this information, he “at times . . . felt just a little out on a limb here.”4 
Roosevelt replied to this reasonable request with vague platitudes. “The problems 
we face,” Roosevelt informed his ambassador, “are so vast and interrelated that 
any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents 
and seven seas.”5 While perhaps true, such a comment left America’s ambassador 
to Japan with very little in the way of guidance from Washington.
The president’s relationships with official experts were also strained by his 
desire to find information through unusual channels. As Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson reflected in his diary, FDR’s “ardent” enjoyment of getting “firsthand 
news . . . in an irregular way” was a “great mixture of good and bad qualities.” 
This enthusiasm kept him engaged and supplied with fresh information. How-
ever, his preoccupation with getting an inside scoop caused him to undervalue 
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10      CHAPTER 1
and even ignore the sort of “mature and solid information which comes from 
orderly processes through the regular channels.” Stimson believed that this was 
an unfortunate habit that “we shall never be able to cure.”6 Officials exploited the 
president’s ad hoc style of decision making and fascination with “outsider” infor-
mation by sending him articles and reports, as well as making personal appeals 
in an attempt to shape Roosevelt’s opinion. For example, Lauchlin Currie, the 
president’s economic adviser and a China hand, wrote to a colleague that he 
had been “pushing, scheming, wrangling, bluffing and pleading all the time” to 
get support for the Chinese Nationalists.7 Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
also privately resolved to “continue to feed the President suggestions” even when 
it appeared they would not be heeded.8 Others asked the president’s secretaries 
to “slip [documents] into his bag” and requested that aides forward items on to 
him.9 While the approach of collecting bits of information informally gave the 
president varied information on the issues, his opinion was necessarily colored 
by the process. Roosevelt was vulnerable to novel ideas presented by enthusias-
tic favorites, and his sources lacked the context and thoughtfulness provided by 
formal processes.
With no clear channel between the president and his diplomatic corps 
at the State Department, the president was more likely to receive lengthy 
field reports from his personal envoys than from stationed embassy officials. 
Roosevelt had a habit of appointing personal ambassadors when he wanted 
“inside” information about situations in Europe and Asia. He encouraged 
foreign leaders to consider these men his “personal representatives” and to 
“to talk to them frankly.” The presence of unofficial “ambassadors” with the 
mandate and ear of the president undermined the authority and mission of 
official ambassadors.10 Although ambassadors and field officers in Asia sent 
reports back to Washington, these needed to pass from the chief of the divi-
sion of Far Eastern affairs to the secretary of state and from there on to the 
president.11 For such a document even to reach Roosevelt through normal 
channels, it needed to suit the interests of both the division chief and the sec-
retary of state, which was no easy task. The former ambassador to Japan later 
recalled that “reporting to our Government was like throwing pebbles into a 
lake at night; we were not permitted to see even the ripples.”12 Although after 
December 1941 the point was moot for the embassy in Japan, this structural 
bias remained important to Roosevelt’s understanding of the complicated 
issue of the internal situation in China. The president’s predilection for send-
ing personal ambassadors provided him with observations from brief visits 
abroad instead of reports from officials with more experience in the region. 
This gave him an understanding of distant countries based largely on anec-
dotal observations rather than expert analysis.
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The president’s support of favorites and his tendency to play staff mem-
bers against each other left his advisers frustrated and confused.13 FDR on 
occasion enthusiastically adopted new policies that he “handed down” as 
ready-made decisions “that brooked no rebellion.”14 He also encouraged rivalry. 
His decision-making process often consisted of setting up a quarrel and then 
deciding the best course after hearing both sides, a practice that drove officials 
“absolutely stark, staring mad.”15 Roosevelt so preferred Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the former was widely rec-
ognized as the unofficial secretary until the end of his career.16 As a result of such 
behavior, Hull openly considered resignation at least twice, complaining that he 
was “constantly affronted and made unhappy by having . . . somebody . . . spring 
a fast diversion in foreign policy over his head, and finding out that the President 
stood by some favorite.”17 In an egregious example of this, Roosevelt in 1944 sud-
denly adopted Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s radical plan to transform 
postwar Germany into an agrarian society after lunching with him. The president 
maintained his support for the plan over vocal protests from his cabinet and in 
spite of the fact that the plan contradicted a consensus on postwar Germany 
created by years of planning. Hull considered this “a repudiation.” A colleague 
reported that the secretary was “worried sick and had not slept for two or three 
nights” as a result of the president’s poor management.18
Although Roosevelt abandoned Morgenthau’s plan as quickly as he had 
adopted it, the incident illustrated the “chaotic” nature of the administration 
because Roosevelt would easily “sign any paper . . . presented to him by one of 
his advisers without waiting for the criticism and counsel of the others.”19 Later, 
when Hull did resign, the president selected the younger and weak-willed Ed 
Stettinius to replace him. Roosevelt informed Stettinius that he had considered 
James Byrnes, a powerful and well-qualified senator, for the position but that 
he had decided on Stettinius because “Jimmy might question who was boss.” 
Stettinius agreed to take the position, tactically conceding that the president had 
sole decision-making power in the realm of foreign policy, on the condition that 
Roosevelt keep the State Department better informed of his plans.20 There is little 
evidence that even this small promise was kept.
Roosevelt’s management of his advisers in Washington caused confusion and 
uncertainty. The president viewed the foreign policymaking process as selecting 
among the recommendations of his advisers, both formal and informal, as he 
saw fit. This practice caused problems within the administration. FDR’s refusal 
to consult and collaborate led to a disconnection between official planning and 
his own thinking. As Hull dryly observed, “The President runs foreign affairs. 
I don’t know what’s going on.”21 Dean Acheson, assistant secretary of state during 
the war, later argued that by excluding the secretary of state from his formulation 
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12      CHAPTER 1
of strategy, Roosevelt created a State Department whose planning process was 
“theoretical and unreal . . . absorbed in platonic planning of a utopia.”22 While 
this book argues that the postwar planning process for Japan did create a solid 
set of useful and flexible postwar aims, it is certainly true that planners worked 
in a vacuum, unaware of executive thinking or the relevant international com-
mitments into which the president had entered. Without any assurance that the 
policies resulting from the bureaucratic planning process would not be cast aside 
by presidential prerogative after the war, planners must also have felt they were 
casting stones into a lake at night.
China as Great Power and Ally
Roosevelt was more vocal about his hopes for postwar China than about his 
thoughts on Japan. Because it was assumed that China would take on the role 
of leading Asian power and would cooperate with American interests, postwar 
Japan could be marginalized. From 1942, the administration supported the idea 
that a collective security system maintained by an international police force 
should be created after the war.23 President Roosevelt took this idea a step further. 
As he explained in the spring of 1943, he hoped to achieve the goal of disarma-
ment that had failed after the First World War. To his way of thinking, America, 
Britain, Russia, and China would act as a “world police” while the other powers 
disarmed, with the eventual goal of universal disarmament.24 The president was 
a vocal advocate for China’s future place as a member of the “big four.” In 1943 
Roosevelt stated in a closed meeting that he “thought that China might become 
a very useful power in the Far East to help police Japan and that he wanted to 
strengthen China in every possible way.” Such support was crucial, as Roosevelt 
was opposed to the idea of long-term expensive American military commitments 
abroad.25 This plan limited the potential role that Japan might play in the postwar 
world and explains why Roosevelt so rarely discussed Japan’s future.
Roosevelt’s personal connections to China help explain his faith in the future 
of US-China relations. His maternal grandfather, Warren Delano, had made his 
fortune in trading tea and opium as a businessman in Canton in the previous 
century.26 Indeed, the president’s mother had lived in Hong Kong for several 
years as a young girl. As a child, young Franklin was treated to stories about his 
mother’s life there, and the house in which he grew up was decorated with arti-
facts from his grandfather’s period in China.27
Roosevelt’s adult views were likely influenced by the pro-China sentiment 
prevalent in the popular media in the 1920s and 1930s and American support 
for the Open Door policy.28 In 1923, he admitted that it was often difficult for 
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Americans (a group in which he presumably included himself) to see the Japa-
nese perspective on international events because of a widely held pro-Chinese 
attitude.29 It was believed that the Nationalist regime (KMT) had a deep affinity 
with American interests and values. The KMT defined itself in opposition to 
three other domestic political forces: the imperial dynasty that had collapsed in 
the revolution of 1912, the chaos and warlordism that the party had overcome 
to assume power in 1926, and its major political rival, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Thus, Nationalist China tied its political legitimacy to the idea of a 
unified China marked by a stable, rule-based political system that was opposed 
to “despotism” and communism. This model of modernism seemed to harmo-
nize with the American ideals of democracy and free trade, especially given the 
significant number of American-educated Chinese officials within the party.30 
The Roosevelts also enjoyed a good relationship with China’s first couple, the 
Chiangs, who were popular Westernized figures in the United States.31 Finally, 
Allied portrayal of China as a great power could provide “rhetorical compensa-
tion” against Japanese wartime propaganda depicting the war as a struggle for 
Asian liberation from foreign domination.32 Such factors were reinforced by the 
pro-Chinese bias held by many of Roosevelt’s close advisers, including Lauchlin 
Currie; the State Department’s most powerful Asianist, Stanley Hornbeck; and 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson. For example, in 1943 Roosevelt was assured by 
an adviser that Chiang would “follow your leadership” because China favored 
“democracy and liberty . . . [as] opposed to the principals of imperialism and 
communism.”33 China seemed a natural ally to the United States.
Roosevelt’s support for China and the KMT remained a driving force for the 
country’s inclusion on the list of great future powers throughout the war. In 1942, 
at an Anglo-American meeting on postwar problems initiated by the president, 
FDR sought to build a consensus on China’s future status as “one of the four 
controlling powers after the war.”34 Although an agreement was reached at this 
and other meetings, the British were never fully convinced of China’s viability 
as a great power, which the prime minister referred to as “the great American 
illusion.”35 Roosevelt and his top advisers continued to support China as one of 
the four great powers even as it became increasingly unstable.36 At the Tehran 
Conference in fall 1943, Roosevelt qualified his support for China in conversa-
tion with the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin. He explained that he understood the 
current weakness of China but continued support out of consideration for the 
long-term potential of the country.37 Thus, even while troubles in China became 
apparent, the United States remained its champion among the Allies.
Roosevelt’s administration began to consider working with rivals to Chiang’s 
leadership in the face of mounting evidence of corruption and incompetence 
within China’s Nationalist government. Reaching out to Chiang’s rivals within the 
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KMT and to leaders in the Communist Party would provide the basis for contin-
ued Sino-American relations in case of a coup, civil war, or the collapse of Chi-
ang’s regime. In 1944 and 1945, officials had a remarkably ambivalent attitude 
toward Chinese communism, and many reports crossed the president’s desk that 
frankly enumerated the faults of the ruling party.38 Chinese communists were often 
described as having strong morale and solid public support gained through practi-
cal reforms.39 As a result of the failure of the KMT to absorb the competing political 
forces into a unified government, American officials began to stress a more flex-
ible approach to the Chinese leadership. As early as May 1944, officials suggested 
showing “a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in China” 
because the present leadership rendered China “too weak to serve as a possible 
counter-weight to Russia.” Communist and leftist groups would be an important 
force in any democratic China and, it was believed, would “naturally gravitate” 
to the United States.40 Shortly before his death, Roosevelt demonstrated both his 
frustration with the KMT and his willingness to consider alternatives to Chiang 
by writing a cordial letter to the leader of the Communist group, Mao Tse-tung.41
In practice, rather than abandoning support for Chiang’s regime, Americans 
approached the conflict between the KMT and CCP with a mix of aid and good 
offices. Policymakers such as Roosevelt and Hull argued that solid American 
backing, rhetorical and financial, was the best chance for stabilizing Chiang’s 
leadership.42 China’s continued resistance to Japan was vital to America’s war 
effort in the Pacific. Beyond its value in fighting the Japanese, Chinese coopera-
tion with Western powers undermined Japanese war propaganda about ending 
European imperialism and creating an “Asia for Asiatics.”43 This was particularly 
important after Japan granted rhetorical independence to former British, Ameri-
can, and Dutch territories. It would have been a severe blow to the Allies had 
China surrendered or allowed the creation of a puppet state as France had done 
in Europe.44 A strong, politically unified China was the best safeguard against 
such an eventuality and a compelling reason to sideline Chiang’s rivals, none of 
whom offered the hope of a legitimate alternative to the current government.
China’s role as a military ally became less important as the American 
island-hopping campaign built up momentum in early 1944.45 By summertime, 
attacks on the central Pacific islands had put the Allies within bombing range 
of Japan proper using B-29 aircraft. American troops could close in on Japan 
through islands in the Pacific, shifting the focus of strategic plans away from 
mainland Asia. 
This new situation corresponded with a low ebb in US-China relations, as 
American generals voiced criticism of Chiang’s commitment to and value in the 
present war. American army planners argued that the war with Japan would be 
over before the Chinese army was properly trained and equipped through aid 
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and lend-lease.46 China was thus marginalized in wartime military plans. How-
ever, the existing consensus and lack of support for any alternative resulted in 
policy inertia over the China issue. Although forced to consider the real possibil-
ity of China’s descending into civil war, Roosevelt maintained his faith and sup-
port in Chiang’s regime and a strong postwar China that could share the burden 
of building peace and stability in the region. The position of the United States in 
regard to China at the end of the war thus remained one of cautious but commit-
ted support.47 Until the end of his life, Roosevelt argued that despite its current 
weakness, China would unite and modernize to assume leadership of the entire 
area that Japan had tried to seize.48
The Case of Germany
For President Roosevelt and others, learning the supposed lessons of the First 
World War was the key to the prevention of future conflict. Roosevelt tied the 
FIGURE 1.1. Franklin D. Roosevelt in conference with General Douglas MacAr-
thur, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Admiral William D. Leahy, while on tour in the 
Hawaiian Islands, September 1944. Courtesy of US Navy, Wikimedia Commons.
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treatment of Japan to his ideas about Germany. Europe, and by extension Ger-
many, was culturally and geographically closer to the frame of reference of the 
president, whose Dutch heritage was tied to his identity.49 Roosevelt had a further 
connection that was important to his thinking on Germany. As a boy he had 
taken a bicycle trip around the country and often cited this as evidence of his 
deep understanding of the German people.50 He had little such firsthand experi-
ence to ground his impressions of the Japanese. In a 1944 speech Roosevelt linked 
the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan to “the 1918 situation,” in which 
Germany had avoided occupation through surrender. Because Berlin had suc-
cessfully “dodged” occupation and had gone on to create a new conflict, after the 
current war Germany and Japan would be occupied by Allied troops “regardless 
of when or how they surrendered.”51 Japan’s fate was thus sealed by the imagined 
lessons learned from the behavior of the Germans after the Great War, a war in 
which Japan had fought against Germany alongside the United States and Great 
Britain.52
The president’s adoption of the Morgenthau plan was another link between 
Japan and Germany. As noted above, in August 1944 Roosevelt suddenly embraced 
his treasury secretary’s enthusiasm for inflicting punishment on the German, 
and by extension the Japanese, people. This was a radical shift from existing 
policy. Up to that point, postwar planning for Germany had been similar to the 
planning for Japan discussed in the next chapter. It was assumed that postwar 
Germany, with its large and productive population and strong industrial capac-
ity, would play a part in rebuilding Europe, and similar plans were developed for 
Japan in Asia.53 Under the new plan, Germany would be stripped of its industrial 
potential, reducing the country to an agricultural economy and removing it from 
future economic or political power in Europe. This entirely contradicted the con-
sensus created in the planning groups but had some precedent in Roosevelt’s 
thinking. In 1943 Roosevelt, ignoring the debate within bureaucratic planning 
groups about whether heavy industry would be needed to sustain the Japanese 
economy, drew up his own memorandum on postwar aviation. Policing would 
be needed to make sure that neither the Germans nor the Japanese were able to 
“fly anything larger than one of those toy planes that you wind up with elastic.”54 
Japan experts believed that crushing industry and impoverishing the country 
would undermine future security by fueling desperation and radicalism. A Japan 
reliant on trade, by contrast, would be tied into the regional system and would 
support postwar rehabilitation throughout the region.55 Roosevelt did not agree.
FDR’s support of the Morgenthau scheme lasted only a few weeks, during which 
time he signed up to the policy, brought Morgenthau to an international confer-
ence in Quebec to push for British support, and just as quickly denounced the 
plan after it received a negative response in the press.56 However, the administrative 
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changes made in this brief window altered the planning process for Germany 
until the end of the war. The German bureaucratic planning subcommittee was 
replaced by a new group, the Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG), 
in order to include the Treasury Department in planning. Because Japan was not 
as pressing an issue for Morgenthau, the move to include Treasury in postwar 
planning for Japan did not come until much later and was successfully contained 
by officials in the State Department.57
Although the bureaucratic planning structure for Japan was not affected by 
Morgenthau’s intervention into Germany policy, as long as Roosevelt supported 
the plan for Germany, he considered that it applied to Japan too. Without con-
sulting other officials, he allowed his enthusiasm for the new German plan to 
override the recommendations of other advisers and experts on both countries. 
Morgenthau recorded the president’s passionate support for a punitive peace in 
his diary. “You either have to castrate the German people,” Roosevelt told him, 
“or you have to threaten them in such a manner that they can’t just go on repro-
ducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.” Morgenthau 
left the meeting with no doubt about FDR’s support of the plan, even if the 
president’s other advisers violently opposed it.58 Roosevelt was convinced of the 
inherent militarism of the German people, arguing that uniforms, parades, and 
“marching of any kind” ought to be banned in postwar Germany to avoid future 
aggression.59 The president also “used some example about Japan” to illustrate 
his support for the plan by “showing how tough he is going to be.”60 Without 
consulting Asia experts or other advisers, Roosevelt tied the Japanese to Morgen-
thau’s plan for Germany.
Unwilling to devolve decision making to area specialists, Roosevelt based his 
plans for both countries on irregular sources of analysis and what he thought he 
knew about German people and history. Roosevelt was content to attach Japan 
to his prescriptions for Germany, despite the fact that Japan’s rapid population 
growth and comparatively low agricultural output made the Morgenthau plan 
impossible to implement without the threat of mass starvation. Roosevelt, how-
ever, may not have been aware of the unsuitability of the Morgenthau plan for 
Japan. Although a report on the question had been approved and was the basis of 
further official planning for Japan’s economy, Roosevelt did not read or request 
many reports from the bureaucratic planners. He would have been informed 
had he consulted the Asia specialists before adopting Morgenthau’s plan.61 Roo-
sevelt’s plans to strip Japan of its colonies, discussed below, would make it par-
ticularly vulnerable. Unlike Germany, which had a rich agricultural base, Japan’s 
arable land was insufficient to feed its population.62 It is clear from this that the 
president’s policy direction for Japan, though not clearly articulated during the 
war, was based firmly on his mercurial and ill-suited plans for postwar Germany.
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Defining Japan
Several factors suggest that racial bias was involved in Roosevelt’s thinking about 
Japan. The president certainly believed that set characteristics were carried in the 
blood of peoples and races. His racial thinking on the Japanese began with his 
views on mixing that population and other races in the 1920s. Roosevelt sup-
ported the 1924 exclusion act, which had caused friction between the American 
and Japanese governments by banning Japanese immigration. He argued in a 
published column that such restrictions were justified because Japanese nation-
als could not assimilate with white Americans. “Mingling of Asiatic blood with 
European or American blood,” he wrote, “produces in nine cases out of ten, the 
most unfortunate results.” This was not, however, intended as a slight against 
“pure” Japanese, who he imagined would feel the same “repugnance” that he 
did at intermarrying or mixing populations.63 His columns made a distinction 
between European immigrants, who were deemed to be useful in revitalizing 
American communities, and Asian immigrants, whose genetic influence would be 
detrimental to the future American population.64 This idea that Europeans were 
able to assimilate, while Asians were not, demonstrated the perceived distance 
in culture and blood between Americans and Japanese. These were long-held 
beliefs, reflected in Roosevelt’s writings over a period of years. A decade later, he 
privately observed that aggression was “in the blood” of the Japanese leadership.65
During the war, Roosevelt ordered funding for research on postconflict relo-
cation for displaced groups around the world. This research, known as the M 
Project, considered “problems arising out of racial admixtures” resulting from 
moving populations. FDR was a product of a time in which scientific racism 
and the idea of a yellow peril held significant currency in American thought. As 
part of the project, he wrote an involved professor and asked him to consider 
whether the “less developed skulls” of the Japanese might explain their racial 
characteristic of “nefariousness.”66 Craniometry, which attempted to identify and 
explain behavioral traits by examining the shape of the head, was a trend within 
nineteenth-century scientific racism. If Japanese militarism was caused by racial 
flaws, rather than the social, political, or economic factors considered by Asia 
experts, peace could not be assured by social engineering. In such a case, a “hard 
peace” of repression and monitoring would be necessary.
Roosevelt’s actions toward Japanese Americans provide a more mixed picture. 
Roosevelt considered the treatment of Japanese Americans during the Second 
World War in two different contexts, internment and military service. In 1936, 
fully five years before the United States and Japan went to war, FDR wrote to his 
chief of operations in Hawaii about identifying Japanese and Japanese Americans 
to be put on a list as “the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event 
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of trouble.”67 Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt responded to a request by the 
secretary of navy to remove “people of Japanese blood” from the strategically 
important island of Oahu to another island “where they can be made to work for 
their living and produce much of their own food.” Roosevelt agreed and added 
that he did “not worry about the constitutional question.” Neither man referred 
to the Americans of Japanese ancestry as American citizens in this correspon-
dence beyond Roosevelt’s reference to constitutionalism but instead called for 
the evacuation and supervision of “Japanese.”68 When considering the question 
of Japanese American military service, however, Roosevelt took an entirely differ-
ent position. He argued that any loyal American ought to be allowed to serve his 
country, as “Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry.”69  
These two examples indicate that his treatment of Japanese Americans was a 
matter of expediency rather than moral conviction. Race was certainly an impor-
tant issue in Roosevelt’s thinking on Japan. However, his treatment of Japanese 
Americans and support for China suggest that racism was not an insurmount-
able feature ingrained in his thinking but could be overcome as a matter of 
convenience.
Roosevelt’s personal knowledge of individual Japanese was to a great extent 
limited to his relationship with two men, Kichisaburo Nomura and Otohiko Mat-
sukata. When Roosevelt wrote in 1925 that his position against Japanese immi-
gration was not anti-Japanese, he noted that he knew “a great many cultivated, 
highly educated and delightful Japanese.”70 This is likely a reference to Matsukata 
and Nomura. Roosevelt met socially with Nomura, the Japanese naval attaché in 
Washington, during his service as assistant secretary of the navy. Nomura later 
became foreign minister and ambassador to the United States. Although the two 
maintained occasional correspondence until the mid-1930s, the relationship did 
not appear to affect Roosevelt’s thinking on Japan as a nation. Otohiko Matsu-
kata was more influential. He was a former classmate of Roosevelt’s at Harvard, at 
the time the only Japanese national enrolled there. Although Matsukata had been 
a personal friend, the connection ironically helped to harden Roosevelt’s later 
perception of Japanese foreign policy. As university students in 1902, Matsukata 
and Roosevelt had had a conversation about Japanese expansionism and plans 
for the conquest of Asia. After Japan’s shift toward militarism in the 1930s, Roo-
sevelt repeatedly recalled this discussion in private conversations, remarking that 
the Japanese “seem to be carrying out this plan.”71 Thus, speculative conversation 
between two young people came to serve an American president as evidence of a 
Japanese conspiracy for domination.
A people capable of holding on to secret plans made decades in advance 
would be a great threat to the postwar world, unlikely to be neutralized by mili-
tary defeat alone. The president presented such a picture of Japanese history in 
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a speech before Congress in 1942. “Japan’s scheme of conquest,” he informed 
them, “goes back half a century. It is not merely a policy of seeking living room, 
it was a plan which included the subjugation of all the peoples in the Far East 
and in the islands of the Pacific.”72 In apportioning blame for Japan’s aggression, 
Roosevelt made no distinction between leadership and the people. A study by 
the Office of War Information (OWI) found that the president differentiated 
between German leadership and the German people about 75 percent of the 
time, referring to “Hitler” and the “Nazis” as the enemy. By contrast, Roosevelt 
referred almost exclusively to “Japan” as a whole when mentioning the enemy. 
Other important figures in the administration, the secretary and undersecretary 
of state, and Harry Truman’s predecessor as vice president, Henry Wallace, were 
more inclined to draw a distinction between the Japanese people and military 
leadership than was Roosevelt. They did so in about half of their references.73
In a campaign speech made in late summer 1944, Roosevelt specifically linked 
the acts of the Japanese government to the people. The Japanese could not be 
trusted, he informed a crowd of reporters, because “whether or not the people 
of Japan itself know and approve of what their warlords have done for nearly a 
century, the fact remains that they seem to have been giving hearty approval to 
the Japanese policy of acquisition of their neighbors and their neighbors’ lands 
and military and economic control of as many other nations as they can get their 
hands on.” Shortly before adopting the Morgenthau plan for Germany, Roosevelt 
publicly stated that after its surrender Japan must be “sealed off” from the rest 
of the world until it proved “willing and able to live with peaceful nations.”74 
The question of separating ordinary people from their leaders was important in 
handling postwar treatment of enemy countries. “Indiscriminate hatred may be 
a mighty weapon,” the report stated, “but it is likely to be impeding to a satis-
factory peace.”75 Roosevelt’s conflation of the Japanese people and government, 
along with his suspicions about Japanese racial characteristics, indicates that he 
supported a hard peace to punish and restrain the Japanese people after the war.
Wartime Conferences and International  
Agreements
While these ideas on postwar plans have been inferred from conversations, state-
ments, and publications, Roosevelt’s record on wartime commitments is clearer. He 
took direct control of policymaking at conferences and international agreements 
with America’s allies, often to the exclusion of the State Department and other 
agencies.76 Publicized announcements on the results of these conferences were 
the major source of popular understanding about postwar plans. Bureaucratic 
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planners, largely isolated from presidential thinking or approval, adjusted their 
recommendations to incorporate the public commitments made at international 
conferences. Although planners were unaware of some of the secret outcomes 
from these conferences, Roosevelt’s international commitments became his 
biggest contribution to postwar planning. They formed the basis of public and 
world expectations.
The first such major contribution to postwar planning came while the United 
States was still neutral. The Atlantic Charter, signed by the American president and 
Britain’s prime minister on August 14, 1941, publicly committed both countries 
to a set of common principles for the postwar world. Several of these principles 
would later be significant for the treatment of postwar Japan and the disposition 
of its territories. The section on international trade and resources was incorpo-
rated into bureaucratic planning and became an issue of contention among offi-
cials. The first and second of the Atlantic Charter principles rejected territorial 
aggrandizement and stated that any territory changes would be made in accor-
dance “with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.”77 As seen below, 
these commitments would sit uncomfortably with Allied plans later in the war.
On occasion, the president made commitments privately without the knowl-
edge of anyone in Washington. Shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Allied 
leaders anticipated the failure of US-Japanese negotiations to prevent conflict 
and assumed that Japan would strike out in order to gain access to new supplies. 
It was generally believed that the Japanese would press farther into Dutch or Brit-
ish possessions in Southeast Asia in search of oil. What the American response 
to such a move would be was unknown. In view of the strong isolationist and 
anti-imperialist sentiments in popular opinion, would the United States be reluc-
tant to provide military support or declare war on Japan in defense of European 
colonies? The question was handled in a particularly Rooseveltian manner. On 
December 2, 1941, during a conversation with the British ambassador, the presi-
dent “threw in an aside” that “we should obviously all be together” fighting Japan 
in case of an attack.78 Roosevelt repeated this pledge to the ambassador two days 
later, but it appears that he never informed the members of his cabinet or other 
high-level officials that he had committed the country to war.79
Just over a year later, in January 1943, Roosevelt made a spur-of-the-moment 
commitment during an Anglo-American meeting in Casablanca that would 
have a great impact on the final days of the war. The president announced to 
the press that the Axis powers—Italy, Germany, and Japan—would be made to 
accept unconditional surrender to Allied forces. British prime minister Winston 
Churchill claimed the announcement was the first he had ever heard about the 
idea, and Roosevelt later explained that “the thought popped into my head” dur-
ing the conference.80 This was characteristic of Roosevelt’s decision-making style; 
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the unconditional surrender concept had been discussed in a State Department 
report by the Subcommittee on Security Problems, which the president may have 
read. The idea had many critics in the State Department and later the military 
because rejecting the possibility of negotiated surrender could, and in the event 
did, prolong the conflict against each of the Axis powers. Had Roosevelt con-
sulted with his advisers before making a public commitment, he might have been 
dissuaded. However, the unconditional surrender demand did have advantages. 
It served a valuable domestic goal in strengthening morale and gave a clear com-
mon goal to the Allied governments. Roosevelt’s successors would consider aban-
doning this evocative and rhetorically powerful term in the summer of 1945, a 
debate ended only by the advent of the atomic bomb.81
The heads of the three major powers engaged in war against Japan met at 
Cairo in December of that same year. At this summit, the United States, China, 
and Britain considered concerted plans for postwar East Asia. While the secretar-
ies of state, war, and navy, and lower-level regional experts had a difficult time 
getting the president’s ear in the run-up to Cairo, the ideas FDR brought to the 
summit were developed gradually and in conversation with representatives of 
Britain and China. In March 1942 Roosevelt invited Britain’s foreign secretary, 
Anthony Eden, to meet with him and the secretary and undersecretary of state to 
discuss the future of East Asia. The principles Roosevelt proposed in this meet-
ing match the key points agreed at Cairo a year and a half later. The president 
suggested returning Manchuria and Formosa to China, creating an international 
trusteeship for Korea, and “internationalizing” Japan’s mandated islands for the 
purpose of keeping peace. Eden indicated approval of Roosevelt’s proposals.82 
In the Cairo Declaration, the United States, Great Britain, and China declared 
that Japan would be “stripped” of the Pacific islands it had occupied since 1914, 
and Korea would be administered by the Allies until fit for self-governance. The 
return of Manchuria and Formosa to China was also agreed on at the confer-
ence.83
The Chinese, too, were included in executive thinking before Cairo. Chiang’s 
regime was kept informed about the outlines of these plans through the personal 
emissaries sent by Roosevelt to China’s wartime capital, Chongqing, and the sub-
ject was discussed at high-level meetings in Washington.84 In 1942, Roosevelt sent 
both Lauchlin Currie and his defeated campaign challenger, Wendell Willkie, on 
missions to China. Currie and Chiang discussed the reversion of Manchuria to 
Chinese sovereignty after Japan’s defeat, which Chiang insisted must go ahead 
in spite of potential objections from the Soviet Union, Japan, or Chinese com-
munists.85 Owen Lattimore, a respected if opinionated expert on the Far East and 
Roosevelt-appointed adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, also kept the Chinese informed 
on Roosevelt’s postwar plans.86
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Occupation Forces
The Chiang-Roosevelt meeting at Cairo also briefly covered unformed ideas on 
an occupation of Japan. Both sides were interested in a substantial Chinese role 
in an Allied military occupation. On the American side, the presence of Chi-
nese troops would weaken the perceived connection between Allied policy and 
European imperialism while reducing the costs and manpower burden of the 
project for the United States. China was interested in asserting its place as a new 
great power and demonstrating its value as a partner in the region. In 1942 the 
quasi-official Chinese delegation to a conference of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions (IPR) recommended “Allied Asiatic troops” occupy Tokyo after Japan’s 
defeat. This position was repeated for a domestic Chinese audience in April 1943 
through a government-approved lead newspaper editorial.87 Although there is no 
record of discussion between Roosevelt or his emissaries and Chinese officials on 
an occupation before the Cairo meeting, he may well have known about China’s 
interest in participation through Currie or Welles, who had been present at the 
FIGURE 1.2. President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Cairo Conference in 
Cairo, Egypt. Seated in the picture (from left to right) are Chiang Kai-Shek, FDR, 
Winston Churchill, and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek. Courtesy of the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum.
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IPR conference.88 However, when Roosevelt proposed that China should take 
the leading role in the occupation of Japan, Chiang refused, stating that China 
was unprepared for such “considerable responsibility.”89 Although eager for rec-
ognition as a great power, China imagined itself in an auxiliary role supporting 
American-led management for postwar Japan.
Dividing Territory
President Roosevelt, the State, War, and Navy Departments, and the Allies largely 
agreed on plans to dismantle Japan’s empire after the war.90 This was partly because 
of anti-imperialist sentiment in the United States and China and partly because, 
regardless of statements to the contrary in the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Dec-
laration, the Allies had territorial interests in Japan’s possessions. Major prizes 
included island chains in the north and south of Japan and the Pacific islands 
that had been granted to Japan as mandates after the Great War. The declaration 
established that Formosa and Manchuria would be returned to China.
When discussing Japanese-controlled territories with Chiang at Cairo, Roo-
sevelt brought up the Ryukyu Islands in southern Japan, inquiring “more than 
once whether China would want” them.91 The Ryukyu Islands had historically 
been an independent kingdom but were formally incorporated into Japan proper 
as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. Because the offer was made without consultation 
with Japan experts, this was likely the result of the president’s ignorance rather 
than an attempt to partition the Japanese home islands.92 Unsurprisingly, Chi-
ang refused the offer, which would have involved the complicated task of annex-
ing a part of Japan proper with a significant civilian population.93 As publicly 
stated later, it was agreed that Formosa and Manchuria would both be returned 
to China.94 The United States was inclined to support the reversion of Formosa to 
an ally, and insistence on Chinese rights in Manchuria had been a sticking point 
in prewar negotiations between America and Japan.
The United States also had interests in Japan’s League of Nations mandate 
islands. Though these islands, collectively known as Micronesia, were small in 
terms of landmass and population, they spread out as points covering an ocean 
area nearly the size of the continental United States.95 Both Washington planners 
and the president agreed that the United States should use these Pacific islands 
as bases, through either international trusteeship or direct control, to increase 
American power in the region and to deny them to potential future aggressors. 
It was important, however, that the annexation of bases across the Pacific would 
appear to be motivated by peace and collective security rather than imperial-
ism and territorial expansion, which had been explicitly rejected by the Atlantic 
Charter and Cairo Declaration.
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This tension is apparent in Roosevelt’s explanation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
in the summer of 1944. Although stating that the country was “seeking no addi-
tional territory as the result of this war,” Roosevelt noted that the as-yet-uncreated 
United Nations organization could ask the United States to “act as a trustee for 
the Japanese mandated islands.” This would give it the “military authority to 
protect” the populations of these islands, which would justify building fortifica-
tions.96 While the trusteeship solution exposed the United States to accusations 
of hypocrisy, it also prevented an open scramble for territorial spoils.97 Ameri-
cans sought to use strategic bases and free trade as an alternative to traditional 
colonialism. Independence for the US colony in the Philippines, for example, was 
predicated on the assumption that the United States would be invited to continue 
its military presence there.98 During the war, this thinking was applied to Japan’s 
empire, and it would later be applied to the country itself.99
The dismemberment of Japan’s empire, announced in the Cairo Declaration, 
was confirmed by the Allies in 1944. This time the Soviet Union was included 
in the discussions. Stalin had been supportive of American base ambitions at 
Tehran in 1943, stating that the victors must “occupy strong points” in the area 
in order to prevent Japan from becoming aggressive again. Roosevelt, naturally, 
“said he agreed 100%.”100 Just before Yalta, Chiang and Stalin agreed on the key 
points of the Cairo Declaration—that Japan would be stripped of her posses-
sions, and, as the United States wanted, that “necessary air and naval bases” would 
be created so that the United Nations could police the western Pacific. Stalin 
accepted that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores would be returned to 
China, and he agreed that a tutelage period was needed for Korea.101 At the same 
time, as seen below, Russia was negotiating with the United States over claims to 
Japanese islands to the north as a price for entering the war with Japan. Thus, 
the interests of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States converged in the 
carving up and reapportioning of Japan’s empire.
Outcomes and Responses to Cairo
The format for the discussion between Chiang and Roosevelt at Cairo on the 
evening of November 23, 1943, led to secrecy and confusion. In an unusual move, 
Roosevelt objected to keeping records from the three-hour meeting. As a result, 
no records were made on the American side. The only people present were the 
president, his adviser Harry Hopkins, and Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. Because 
of objections from Chiang, an agenda for the meeting was not agreed on before-
hand.102 During talks that evening, Roosevelt made a “vague and loose” com-
mitment to arm ninety Chinese divisions at the end of the war in an effort to 
modernize the Chinese army, a massive undertaking. The agreement was not 
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written down, and Hopkins could not later recall whether it had been made 
unconditionally or whether military aid was contingent on the stabilization of 
the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The agreement came to light 
only in September 1945, five months after the president’s death and one month 
after the war ended, when the Chinese Nationalist government demanded sup-
plies to make good on this promise.103 The incident highlights Roosevelt’s lack 
of regard for his advisers, whom he neither consulted nor informed of major 
decisions. It also demonstrates the confusion caused by his private initiatives in 
foreign policymaking.
The most important aspect of the Cairo Declaration, which was released to 
the public on December 1, 1943, was that it seemed to guarantee cooperation 
between the Allies for postwar security. In addition to the declaration itself, 
which laid out the basis for dismantling Japan’s empire, planners had access to 
media sources for analysis and information. The statement in a New York Times 
article covering the conference that “Tokyo’s co-prosperity sphere, which gin-
gerly commenced with the seizure of Formosa in 1895, will be entirely scrapped,” 
for example, was quite accurate. Likewise, the article’s prediction that a “new and 
greater China” would rise “from the ashes” of a Japan-dominated Pacific is in line 
with Roosevelt’s expectations for both nations.104 Other sources of policy ideas 
and planning had to adapt their positions to match this new reality of commit-
ments made at Cairo. But the bureaucrats tasked with drafting American policy 
were not aware of secret agreements such as Roosevelt’s promise to arm Chinese 
troops or his offer of the Ryukyu Islands.
Soviet Entry and Yalta
The issue of Russia’s entry into the war against Japan was one on which the 
American president, the State Department, and China’s leadership were particu-
larly far apart. The Soviet Union had signed a nonaggression pact with Japan in 
1941, and was therefore not involved in the Pacific theater. However, Roosevelt’s 
plans for postwar East Asia assumed a major role for the Soviet Union.105 The 
Chinese, by contrast, hoped for a Pacific sphere controlled by the Americans 
and Chinese alone. As Chiang explained to one of Roosevelt’s emissaries, the 
influence of Great Britain in postwar Asia ought to be limited because it was 
an imperialist power, while the Soviet Union presented a communist threat to 
the region.106 Given the civil war brewing between Chiang’s Nationalist regime 
and the Chinese Communist Party, the threat to the KMT of an ascendant and 
ideologically opposed Soviet Union was real. Competing territorial aims were 
a second reason for China’s reluctance to accept a major role for Russia. Before 
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Cairo, both Chiang and his brother-in-law, the well-regarded diplomat and 
financier T.V. Soong, expressed concern to American officials that Russia might 
challenge the reversion of Manchuria to China in light of its past rivalry with 
Japan for influence in the area.107 Indeed, Stalin was interested in reclaiming 
rights in Manchuria, particularly over the southern section of the Chinese East-
ern Railway to Dairen, which had in the nineteenth century given Russia access 
to a valuable Far East warm-water port.108 Roosevelt and Welles were sympa-
thetic to Russian interests in northern China, counseling Soong that the country 
would have to recognize the Soviet Union’s legitimate commercial interests in 
Manchuria.109
American Far East experts in the State Department were also skeptical about 
Russia’s future role in the region. They were shocked to hear about Roosevelt’s 
aim of involving the Soviet Union in the Pacific theater of the war and his will-
ingness to give concessions that would increase Russia’s postwar strength in the 
region in order to reach this aim. As one planner explained, “We saw no reason 
why the U.S.S.R. should have been paid for entering the war against Japan, when 
it would have served our interests better to have the Soviet Union stay out.”110 
They were not consulted on the subject, however. The State Department drew up 
detailed briefs to prepare Roosevelt ahead of Yalta, but the president did not read 
them.111 Unbeknownst to the State Department, FDR had personally encouraged 
Soviet participation from at least July1943, using the carrot of territorial gain. At 
that time, Roosevelt proposed a meeting with Stalin, informing the Soviet charge 
d’affaires through his own representative that he “would surprise Stalin by how 
far he, Roosevelt, is ready to acknowledge our [Soviet] rights, in particular, on 
territorial issues.” At this point, the Soviets expected Roosevelt would bring up 
the issue in any meeting between the heads of state, but they were not yet pre-
pared to abandon their neutrality pact with Japan.112
A year and a half later, at Yalta, Roosevelt finally secured a commitment from 
the Soviets to enter the war against Japan two to three months after the defeat 
of Germany.113 This agreement was conditioned on territorial gains for Russia at 
the expense of both Japan and China. From China, Russia would regain leased 
control of Port Arthur, which had been lost after the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904–5, have its preeminent interests recognized in an internationalized Dairen, 
and gain a measure of control over Chinese railways in these areas. Japan would 
lose islands to the north along its border with Russia—namely, all of Sakhalin 
and “islands adjacent” to it and the Kurile Islands.114 As a price for Soviet entry 
into the war against Japan, Franklin Roosevelt approved what was essentially a 
reversal of one of the key achievements of his cousin and hero, former president 
Teddy Roosevelt, who had been awarded a Nobel Prize in 1906 for brokering the 
peace treaty after the Russo-Japanese War.
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Roosevelt had good reason for his differences with the State Department on 
the issue of Soviet involvement in the war. Bureaucratic planners believed that 
the initiative for planning and policy in postwar Asia ought to be held by the 
United States, which had borne the brunt of fighting in the Pacific. The post-
war situation could be more easily handled without the Russians. By contrast, 
Roosevelt and the War Department were eager to encourage Soviet involve-
ment, which would make Allied victory more likely and shorten the war. The 
Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria was believed to be very strong, and 
military planners expected the Japanese would draw on it in case of an Allied 
land invasion of Japan’s home islands, the dominant end-of-war scenario 
before the atomic bomb was successfully tested. The Soviet Union, which bor-
dered Manchuria, could tie up the Japanese there and limit potential reinforce-
ments ahead of a land invasion. In addition, Stimson pragmatically argued that 
the Allies were in no position to prevent the Soviets from simply taking what-
ever territories they coveted after the war and so might as well collect a price 
for them.115
FDR was less concerned than his planners were about American predomi-
nance in postwar policy. In addition to strengthening the Russian hand, he sought 
to include China in decision making and hoped the country would take on a 
major role in occupying and monitoring Japan. During his talk at Cairo with the 
Chinese leader, he asked Chiang’s position on the retention of the emperor after 
Japan’s defeat, which was an issue of huge symbolic value. As discussed above, he 
also offered China Japanese territory and suggested China take the leading role 
in the military occupation of Japan, burdensome honors that Chiang politely 
refused.116 Roosevelt dealt with this difference in opinion on the Soviet question 
by simply ignoring and excluding the side with which he disagreed. Even senior 
members of the State Department were denied records from the Yalta conference. 
Bureaucratic planners were kept in the dark about the secret agreement with the 
Soviets, although the pact was significant to postwar planning, having territo-
rial implications and giving the Soviets an unexpected stake in postwar Japan.117 
Thus, although all known Roosevelt commitments were incorporated into any 
policy proposals, secret agreements left wartime planners to draw up their plans 
while lacking significant information.
Roosevelt’s health declined rapidly in the last year of his life and presidency. By 
early spring 1944 he had become, in the words of historian Christopher Thorne, a 
“part time president.”118 Although he remained active on the issues most impor-
tant to him, this limitation touched every aspect of the administration. There was 
no clear line of policy approval apart from presidential sponsorship of ideas, and 
Roosevelt’s ability to make agreements or change course without consultation 
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was still a wild card for planners. Roosevelt’s mixed management of Far East 
policy left uncertainty about the future of the postwar plans for Asia.
Even as FDR held the policy reins and his intentions close, his actions and 
ideas set parameters for postwar planning. This was particularly true in the case 
of territorial issues. The outlines of future action were set by the public com-
mitments and international agreements made by Roosevelt during and imme-
diately before the war. All plans from any quarter of government would need to 
reflect the commitments made by the president to Allied governments and in the 
Atlantic Charter, the Casablanca Declaration, and the Cairo Declaration. Further, 
because presidential approval was needed to turn recommendations into official 
policy, proposals had to incorporate Roosevelt’s ideas and interests to the extent 
that these were known by the planners.
President Roosevelt showed little interest in the work of official experts work-
ing on postwar issues, preferring to find analysis from outside official channels. 
As a result, planners sometimes worked in a vacuum, without a voice in wartime 
agreements and uncertain of their president’s plans. Had he lived to see Japan’s 
surrender, FDR might have rejected the recommendations of his planners. He 
might well have impulsively adopted suggestions from advisers outside the plan-
ning process without consulting experts, as with his temporary championship of 
the Morgenthau plan. Certainly, he was sympathetic to the idea of a tough peace 
for Japan. The approach to Japan that emerged from the bureaucratic planning 
process did not reflect Roosevelt’s thinking on the subject. Harry Truman, not 
Roosevelt, made a selection from the policy basket, and Roosevelt’s role in shap-
ing that selected policy was limited to parameters set by his wartime actions and 
the ideas he did make known. By supporting planning groups to fill a basket of 
ideas, however, Roosevelt encouraged the development of a policy network that 
could respond to postwar questions during the war.
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